Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining by Norman Schofield & Ugur Ozdemir
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (2009) 207–242
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica
Received 16 June 2007; Accepted 27 July 2008
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Norman Schoﬁeld∗, Ugur Ozdemir∗∗
Abstract The key theoretical idea in this paper is that activist groups contribute resources to
their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. These resources are then
used by a party to enhance the leader’s valence — the electoral perception of the quality of the
party leader. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, will balance
a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. Under proportional electoral
rule, there need be no pressure for activist groups to coalesce, leading to multiple political par-
ties. Under plurality rule, however, small parties face the possibility of extinction. An activist
group linked to a small party in such a polity has little expectation of inﬂuencing government
policy. The paper illustrates these ideas by considering recent elections in Turkey, Britain and
the United States, as well as a number of European polities.
Keywords Election, plurality rule, proportional representation, activist groups
JEL classiﬁcation H10, H11 ∗∗∗
1. A spatial model of politics
There are two fundamentally different sets of models of the polity. One class of models
has grown out of the attempt to model political competition when the electoral system
is based on a majoritarian or plurality method (sometimes called “ﬁrst past the post”).
Early versions of such models assumed that there were at most two parties (Downs
1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1973) and that the policy space was restricted to one di-
mension. Under the further assumption that parties or candidates adopted positions in
order to win, it was inferred that parties would converge to the electoral median, under
deterministic voting. This result could not be extended to higher dimensions because
of results on the generic non-existence of a core, or voting equilibrium (McKelvey
and Schoﬁeld 1987; Schoﬁeld 1985; Saari 1997). Later work modeled multi-party
elections using stochastic methods (Lin et al. 1999; Banks and Duggan 2005; McKel-
vey and Patty 2006) and suggested that vote maximizing agents would converge to a
Nash equilibrium at the electoral mean. In the empirical component of this paper, clear
evidence is presented that convergence is very unlikely.
It is not obvious that these electoral models are relevant in a political system with
multiple parties. Riker (1962), for example, ignored the question of elections, and fo-
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cused on the nature of post-election bargaining over coalition formation. Riker’s work
on coalition has led to the second class of models, appropriate for studying polities
based on proportional electoral methods (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Banks and Dug-
gan 2000).
Recent work (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2003) has
argued that institutional characteristics of political systems, such as presidentialism
versus parliamentarianism, and majoritarianism versus proportionality, will have sig-
niﬁcant effects on the size of government and the extent of redistributive politics. How-
ever, these arguments have been based on cross country empirical analyses and rela-
tively simple one dimensional spatial models.
To gain an understanding of the differences between plurality and proportional
electoralsystemsitisnecessarytocombinemodelsofelectionsandmodelsofcoalition
bargaining. Thus a formal theory of politics must connect the nature of the electoral
system, the motivations of parties concerning policy and perquisites, and the process
of government formation, in a way which is consistent with the empirical phenomena.
This paper attempts to relate pre-election and post-election political behavior by
focusing on thenature of activistsupportforthe parties. To illustratetheidea, Section 2
brieﬂy presents a stochastic electoral model of two elections in Turkey in 1999 and
2002. The models use sociodemographic characteristics of voters in the sample to
estimate the electoral responses. The equilibria so obtained were quite distinct from
the electoral mean, and were found to be similar to the actual estimated positions of
the parties. The discrepancy between the vote maximizing positions of the parties and
their estimated positions was taken as evidence that the positions were inﬂuenced by
party activists. The underlying model is one in which activists provide crucial support
to party leaders in return for the adoption of policies that the activists prefer.
In the post election context, we can assume that these activists inﬂuence the parties
in the policies that are to be adopted. This model is very different from the Downsian
case, where it was assumed that parties adopted policy positions simply to gain votes.
In the model presented here, party leaders can be assumed to have policy preferences
induced from those of their supporting activists. In principle, this model is applicable
both to plurality and proportional electoral systems.
This model provides a rationale for policy preferences by party leaders in the con-
text of coalition formation, and we use this assumption in Section 3 to propose a spatial
model of bargaining.
In multi-party political systems, there is generally no guarantee that the party gain-
ing the most seats will become a member of the governing coalition. This paper will
use the idea of the core, presented earlier in Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990), to argue that
a dominant party, located at the center of the policy space, can control the formation
of government. Instead of assuming that the ‘political game’ is constant sum or based
on a one-dimensional policy space, we shall consider situations where the policy space
may have two or more dimensions, and government results from bargaining between
three or more parties. In this post-election phase, the ‘positions’ of the parties are
assumed to be given, as is the distribution of seats. This distribution deﬁnes a set of
winning coalitions. Given the set of winning coalitions, and party positions, we use the
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theory of the “political heart” (Schoﬁeld 1999) to discuss coalition bargaining. Under
some circumstances, the heart will consist of a single policy point, the “core”. If the
“core” is stable under small perturbations in the positions of the parties then it is said
to be “structurally stable”. If a party’s position is at the “structurally stable core”, then
we shall call this party the “core party”. Under these circumstances, it is argued that
the “core party” may form a minority government. If the heart is not given by a point,
then it will comprise a domain in the policy space, “the cycle set”. This “cycle set” will
be “bounded” by the preferred positions of a particular set of parties. These bounding
“proto-coalitions” form the basis for coalitional bargaining. This model of the heart
can then used to describe, heuristically, the general pattern of coalition formation
Although scholars are in fair agreement concerning the positions of parties in a
one-dimensional (left-right) policy space, party positions in two dimensions are much
more difﬁcult to ascertain. Empirical models can be constructed on the basis of multi-
dimensional data on party policy positions that have been derived from the content
analysis of party manifestos in European polities.1 An alternative method is to use
survey data and estimate party positions in a policy space obtained from factor analysis
of these data (Schoﬁeld and Sened 2006; Schoﬁeld et al. 2009a,b). It is generally
possible to reduce these data to two dimensions giving a tractable description of the
main political issues in these countries. This paper uses survey data in Section 2 and
theexpertestimatesofpartypositionpresentedinBenoitandLaver(2006)inSection3.
Using these estimates of party position, we can then determine whether the core is
empty, and if it is, deduce the location of the “cycle set” or heart. In two dimensions,
it is possible for a core to occur in a structurally stable fashion, but it will generally
be necessary that the core party is dominant in terms of its seat strength. Since a core
party will be able to veto any coalitional proposal, we expect this party to belong to the
government. On the other hand if the core is empty then no party can have a veto of
this kind, and it is natural to expect greater uncertainty in coalition outcomes. In such
a situation, for any incumbent coalition and policy point, there is always an alternative
coalition that can win with a new policy point. This it can do by seducing some mem-
bers of the incumbent coalition away, by offering them a higher policy payoff than they
can expect if they remain loyal to the original coalition. However, because the heart
will be bounded by a small number of median arcs, we can identify these arcs with a
set of minimal winning coalitions. It is suggested that bargaining between the parties
will result in one or other of these coalition governments. In Section 3 of this paper, we
shall use the estimated positions and relative sizes of the parties, together with the con-
cepts of the core and heart to suggest a categorization of different types of bargaining
environments, distinguishing between unipolar, bipolar and triadic political systems.
In left unipolar systems such as Norway, Sweden and Denmark there is typically
one larger party and three or four smaller parties. The larger party may be able to
dominate coalition politics, and form a minority government with or without the tacit
support of one of the other parties. In triadic systems, such as Austria and Germany
1 Theoriginalmanifestogroupuseda54-categorypolicycodingschemetorepresentpartypolicyinnineteen
democracies. The more recent work (Budge, Klingemann et al. 2001) covers twenty ﬁve countries. See also
Benoit and Laver (2006) who use expert estimates.
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(where typically there are two large and one or two small parties) most coalition ca-
binets are both minimal winning and minimal connected winning. In bipolar systems,
such as the Netherlands and Finland, there are typically two large and a number of
smaller parties (discussion of these two polities can be found in Schoﬁeld 2008). Cen-
ter unipolar systems, such as Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland typically have two
large and at least two other small parties. Minority or surplus coalitions are infrequent
and governments are usually minimal winning coalitions. Finally, Italy (until the elec-
tion of 1994) had a strongly dominant party, the Christian Democrats. This party was
in every coalition government, and relatively short-lived governments were very com-
mon (Mershon 2002). By 1994, the dominance of the Christian Democrat party had
evaporated (Giannetti and Sened 1994).
As we discuss the various polities in Section 3, it is quite clear that under propor-
tional representation, the number of parties and their relative strengths can change in
radical ways, inducing complex changes in the possibility of a core and in the conﬁg-
uration of the heart.
Section 4 returns to the activist formal model and considers models of the plurality
electoral systems of Britain and the United States. Section 5 concludes by arguing
that the motivations of activists under proportional representation and plurality rule are
fundamentally different.
2. Modelling the election and the legislature
We assume in this section that each party chooses a preferred position (or bliss point) in
a policy space X. We shall denote the parties as P={1,..., j,...,p}, and the vector of
party ideal points as z = (z1,...,zp). After the election we denote the number of seats
controlled by party, j, by sj and let s=(s1,...,sp) be the of the vector of parliamentary
seats. We shall suppose that any coalition with more than half the seats is winning, and
denote the set of winning coalitions by D. This assumption can be modiﬁed without
any theoretical difﬁculty. For each winning coalition M ∈ D there is a set of points
in X such that, for any point outside the set there is some point inside the set that
is preferred to the former by all members of the coalition. Furthermore, no point in
the set is unanimously preferred by all coalition members to any other point in the
set. This set is the Pareto set of the coalition. If the conventional assumption is made
that the preferences of the actors can be represented in terms of Euclidean distances,
then this Pareto set for a coalition is simply the convex hull of the preferred positions
of the member parties. (In two dimensions, we can draw this as the area bounded by
straightlinesjoiningtheblisspointsofthepartiesandincludingallcoalitionmembers.)
Since preferences are described by the vector, z, we can denote this as Pareto(M,z).
Now consider the intersection of these Pareto sets for all winning coalitions. If this
intersection is non-empty, then it is a set called the Core of D at z, written Core(D,z).
At a point in Core(D,z) no coalition can propose an alternative policy point that is
unanimously preferred by every member of some winning coalition. An alternative
way to characterize the core in the case of Euclidean preferences is to deﬁne a median
line in X (in the two-dimensional case) to be a line joining the positions of two parties,
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with the property that the set of parties on either side of the line controls a majority
of the seats. In higher dimensions a median hyperplane can be deﬁned analogously.
The core will exist if all median lines intersect. When the core is empty then the heart,
H (D,z) is deﬁned to be the star shaped ﬁgure bounded by these median lines (or
hyperplanes in higher dimension). An attractive feature of the heart, regarded as a
correspondence is that if Core(D,z) is nonempty, and z0 converges to z then H (D,z0)
converges to Core(D,z).
To construct an electoral model of the choice of the vector z = (z1,...,zp) of party
positions as well as the set, D of winning coalitions, we shall ﬁrst adopt a simple
stochastic model in which parties attempt to maximize their vote share. We show that
the model typically gives heterogenous, non-centrist positions. Using this model, we
can then estimate the heart of the legislature, and determine whether there is a core, or
a possibly a majority party.
2.1 The core and the heart of the legislature: Turkey 1999–2007
We use a stochastic vote model, denoted E(l,q,b;Y), to estimate voter utility, uij.
The model assumes that the errors, e ={e1,...,ej,...,ep} are distributed by the Gum-
bel distribution, Y, as required for multinomial conditional logit (MNL) estimation
(Dow and Endersby 2004). We also assume that the set of voters, N, are equally
weighted. For this model we assume that voter i utility is given by the expression:
uij(xi,zj) = lj +(qj ·hi)−bkxi−zjk2+ej
Here q is a set of m-vectors {qj} representing the effect of the k different sociode-
mographic parameters (class, domicile, education, income, religious orientation, etc.)
on voting for party j while hi is an m-vector denoting the ith individual’s relevant
“sociodemographic” characteristics. The compositions {(qj ·hi)} are scalar products.
The spatial coefﬁcient is denoted b and l = {lj : j ∈ P} are the intrinsic valences for
the parties in P. The vector z = (z1,...,zp) ∈ X p is the set of party positions, while
x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ Xn is the set of ideal points of the voters in N. When b is assumed
zero then the model is called pure sociodemographic (SD), and denoted E(l,q;Y).
When {qj} are all assumed zero then the model is called pure spatial, and denoted
E(l,b;Y). When all parameters are included then the model is called joint, denoted
E(l,q,b;Y). The differences in log marginal likelihoods for two models then gives
the Log Bayes’ factor for the pairwise comparison.2 We use the stochastic model to
discuss the Turkish election results in 1999 and 2002, given in Tables 1 and 2. Details
of the MNL estimation are available in Schoﬁeld, Gallego, Ozdemir and Zakharov
(2009).3 The estimates presented there show that the joint model was statistically su-
perior to the other possible models.4 We can infer that, though the sociodemographic
2 Since the Bayes’ factor for a comparison of two models is simply the ratio of marginal likelihoods, the log
of the Bayes factor is the difference in log likelihoods. See Schoﬁeld and Sened (2006).
3 The estimation is based on a factor analysis of a sample survey conducted by Veri Arastima for TUSES.
4 The log Bayes factor for the joint model over the sociodemographic model in 1999 was highly signiﬁcant
31.3 in 1999. Similarly, the log Bayes factor for the joint model over the sociodemographic model was 58.7
in 2002. The Bayes’ factors for the joint over the spatial models were slightly signiﬁcant at 6.13 and 5.17 in
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variables are useful in predicting voter choice, it is necessary to use a joint model based
on both sociodemographic and spatial variables.
Table 1. Turkish election results 1999
Party Name % Vote Seats % Seats
Democratic Left Party DSP 22.19 136 25
Nationalist Action Party MHP 17.98 129 23
Virtue Party FP 15.41 111 20
Motherland Party ANAP 13.22 86 16
True Path Party DYP 12.01 85 15
Republican People’s Party CHP 8.71
People’s Democracy Party HADEP 4.75
Others 4.86
Independents 0.87 3 1
Total 550
Table 2. Turkish election results 2002
Party Name % Vote Seats % Seats
Justice and Development
Party
AKP 34.28 363 66
Republican People’s Party CHP 19.39 178 32
True Path Party DYP 9.54
Nationalist Action Party MHP 8.36
Young Party GP 7.25
People’s Democracy Party HADEP 6.22
Motherland Party ANAP 5.13
Felicity Party SP 2.49
Democratic Left Party DSP 1.22
Others 5.12
Independents 1.00 9 2
Total 550
Figures 1 and 3 show the electoral distributions (based on a sample surveys of sizes
635 and 483, respectively) and estimates of party positions for 1999 and 2002.
Minor differences between these two ﬁgures include the change of the name of the
Kurdish party from HADEP to DEHAP (we retain the name HADEP in Figure 3) and
the disappearance of the Virtue Party (FP) which was banned by the Constitutional
Court in 2001. In 1999, a DSP minority government formed, supported by ANAP
1999 and 2002, respectively.
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Figure 1. Party positions and voter distribution in Turkey in 1999


























Figure 2. The heart in Turkey in 1999
and DYP. This only lasted about 4 months, and was replaced by a DSP-ANAP-MHP
coalition. During the period 1999–2002, Turkey experienced two severe economic
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Figure 3. Party positions and voter distribution in Turkey in 2002
crises. As Tables 1 and 2 show, the vote shares of the parties in the governing coalition
went from about 53% in 1999 to 15% in 2002. The most important change in 2002
was the appearance of the new Justice and Development Party (AKP), which can be
regarded as a replacement for the banned FP. The AKP obtained about 35% of the vote
and 363 seats out of 550 seats (or 66%), in 2002, indicating that the electoral system
had become a much more majoritarian. In 2007, the AKP gained 46.6% of the vote
and a majority of 340 seats (or 62%), reﬂecting the continuing high valence of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the AKP.5 We can compute the heart for 1999 by estimating
all median lines in Figure 1. The heart for 1999 is the set bounded by these median
lines, as shown in Figure 2. If all medians intersect then the core is non-empty. Clearly
the AKP had a majority in 2002 and 2007, and so was at the core position.
The estimated valences of the ANAP and MHP, under the pure spatial model
dropped between 1999 and 2002. In 1999, the estimated lANAP was 0.336, whereas
in 2002 it was −0.31, while lMHP fell from 0.666 to −0.12. The estimated valence,
lAKP, of the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 was 0.78, in compari-
son to the valence of the FP of −0.159 in 1999. This we can ascribe to the disillusion
of most voters with the other parties, as well as the charisma of Erdogan.
For the pure spatial model, the b coefﬁcient was 0.375 in 1999, and 1.52 in 2002,
suggesting that electoral preferences over policy had become more intense.
5 Although Erdogan was the party leader, Abdullah Gul became Prime Minister after the November 2002
election because Erdogan was banned from holding ofﬁce. Erdogan took over as Prime Minister after win-
ning a by-election in March 2003.
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The formal model presented in Schoﬁeld (2007) obtains necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for the joint origin z0 = (0,...,0) to be a Nash Equilibrium in the vote
maximizing game. In 1999, the FP had the lowest valence, and the Hessian of the FP







The eigenvalues of the Hessian can be shown to be −0.74, with eigenvector (1,−1.12)
and0.23, withtheorthogonaleigenvectororprincipalaxisgivenbythevector(1,0.89).
This principal axis is aligned at approximately 45 degrees to the religion axis in Fi-
gure 1. Obviously, the origin is a saddlepoint for the FP vote function, and theory
requires that this party move up or down the principal axis, away from the origin.
Other parties should follow suit. Clearly this theoretical prediction catches the gross
conﬁguration of party positions in Figure 1.
In 2002, the lowest valence party is ANAP, and in precisely the same way, the







The major eigenvalue for ANAP is 3.85, with eigenvector (1.02,1.0) and minor
eigenvalue 0.09, with orthogonal eigenvector (−1.0,1.02). In this case z0 is a mini-
mum for the ANAP vote function, and we expect all parties to scatter away from the
origin. Figure 4 presents an LNE obtained from simulation of the pure spatial model
for 2002.
Notice that the estimated position of the CHP (the Republican People’s Party) is
much further to the left on the Religion axis in both 1999 and 2002, than obtained
in the simulated LNE for the pure model. Supporters of the CHP tend to be Alevis,
a non-Sunni religious community, who are adherents of Shia Islam rather than Sunni,
and may be viewed as activists for “Kemalism” or the secular state. Indeed, in the joint
model, E(l,q,b;Y), voters who are Alevi have a very high additional valence for the
CHP. The FP is also far from the principal axis, to the right on the religion axis in 1999,
as expected for a party whose adherents are Sunni. We now introduce the joint model
to obtain a better estimate of LNE. We also introduce a more general model based on
activists.
2.2 Extension of the model for Turkey
In this section we present a model of party activists, and then use the joint sociodemo-
graphic model to obtain information about activists. These activist functions {mj : j ∈
P} are functions of party position, rather than exogenous constants. Schoﬁeld (2006a)
shows that the ﬁrst order condition for a local equilibrium in this model is given by the
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Figure 4. A Local Nash equilibrium for the pure spatial model for Turkey in 2002
The terms {
dmj
dzj } are the the marginal activist pulls (or gradients) (giving the marginal
activist effects on each party j , while the gradient terms {
dE ∗
j
dzj (zj) = zel
j −zj} are
the electoral pulls on the parties, each one pointing towards the weighted electoral
mean, zel
j , of the party. The weighted electoral mean essentially weights voter policy
preferences by the degree to which the group-speciﬁc valences inﬂuence the choice of
the voter. The joint model, E(l,q,b;Y), allows us to draw some inferences about
equilibrium positions. First we note that the sociodemographic variables imply that we













Figure 5 gives one of the local Nash equilibrium, obtained by simulation of the
joint model with group speciﬁc valences. In this model the activist functions are not
included, so
dmj
dzj (zj) = 0. This equilibrium vector gives estimates of {zel
j } and the sim-




Party CHP MHP DYP HADEP ANAP AKP
x-axis −0.5 0.2 0.1 −0.7 −0.1 0.4
y-axis −0.5 0.2 0.1 −0.7 −0.1 0.4


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Figure 5. A LNE for the joint model for Turkey in 2002
Notice that the party positions in this LNE are much closer to the estimated posi-
tions of the parties. Moreover, they also lie on the principal component given by an
eigenvector (1.0,1.0), which is almost identical to the eigenvector for the LNE ob-




Party CHP MHP DYP HADEP ANAP AKP
x-axis −2.0 0.0 0.0 −2.0 −0.2 1.0
y-axis −0.1 1.5 0.5 −1.5 −0.1 0.1


That is, assuming that this vector is in equilibrium with respect to the full model












Assuming that the joint model with activists is valid, then the difference between these




Party CHP MHP DYP HADEP ANAP AKP
x-axis −1.5 −0.2 −0.1 −1.3 −0.1 −0.6
y-axis −1.5 −1.3 −0.4 −0.8 −0.1 −0.3


From the joint model, the group speciﬁc valences for HADEP (or DEHAP) by
Kurdish voters were very high:
(qHADEP·hKurd) = 5.9 in 1999
(qDEHAP·hKurd) = 6.0 in 2002
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The joint electoral model would predict that the party would move close to Kurdish
voters. Kurdish voters will tend to be located on the left of the religion axis, and are
also anti-nationalistic. We can assert that, with very high probability, the group valence
effects will be signiﬁcant for HADEP in the two elections. We can further infer that
the estimated activist pull on HADEP is very high, pulling the party to the left on the
religion axis, and in an anti-nationalist direction on the y axis.
Similarly, theestimated activistpullon the CHP isextremely high, and wecan infer
that this is due to the inﬂuence of Alevi voters. The Alevis are a non-Sunni religious
community, who are adherents of Shia Islam rather than Sunni, and may be viewed as
supporters of “Kemalism” or the secular state. Another way of expressing this is that
Alevi voters have very high group speciﬁc valence for the CHP, with
(qCHP·hAlevi) = 3.1 in 1999,
(qCHP·hAlevi) = 2.6 in 2002.
As a consequence, the CHP will move to a vote maximizing position, on the left
of the religious axis, as in Figure 5, which allows it to take advantage of this support.
This asymmetry will cause Alevi activists to provide further differential support for the
CHP. It is thus plausible that secular voters (on the left of the religious axis in Figures 1
and 3) would offer further support to the CHP, located close to them. This would affect
the party’s marginal activist pull, and induce the CHP leader to move, in equilibrium,
even further left.
A different argument holds for the AKP in 2002. The relative valence lAKP =1.97,
for the joint model is large and signiﬁcant, so the weighted electoral mean, zel
AKP lies
on the principal eigenvector, while activist support for the AKP would move it to the
right on the religion axis, as well as in an anti-nationalism direction.
In contrast, if the military provides activist support for the MHP on the nationalism
axis, then this party will move left in a secular direction, and north on the nationalism
axis. Overall, we note that we can expect activist valence to strongly inﬂuence party
positioning, and we can proxy this support to some degree using the sociodemographic
variables.
In the 2007 election, the members of Kurdish Party (now called the Freedom and
Solidarity Party, DTP) contested the election as independents, and thus were not sub-
ject to the 10 percent cut-off, and so were able to win 24 seats. The AKP took 46.6
percent of the vote, reﬂecting the continuing high valence of Erdogan. On August 29,
2007, Abdullah Gul, Erdogan’s ally in the AKP, was elected president of Turkey. The
tensions between the DTP and the authorities increased on 18 December 2007 when
the Turkish military arrested Nurettin Demirtas, the leader of the DTP, alleging that he
had forged documents to avoid military service.6
6 It was also alleged that there were links between Demirtas and the outlawed Kurdish Workers’ Party, the
PKK.
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Table 3. Turkish election results 2007
Party Name % Vote Seats % Seats
Justice and Development Party AKP 46.6 340 61.8
Republican People’s Party CHP 20.9 112 20.3
Nationalist Movement Party MHP 14.3 71 12.9
Democrat Party DP 5.4
Young Party GP 3.0
Felicity Party SP 2.3
Independents 5.2 277 4.9
Others 2.3
Total 100 550 100
3. Typologies of “multiparty” polities
7
The previous examples suggest that parties do not appear to adopt Nash equilib-
rium positions based on a simple vote maximizing game. The next section considers
a more general electoral model, where each party is dependent on activist support. In
this model parties gain support from activists, as long as the party position is chosen in
response to activist demands. We can interpret this to mean that the party implicitly has
policy preferences. However, since there may well be many potential activist groups in
a polity, we may expect a number of parties to respond to activist demands. Below, we
shall discuss the simpler case of plurality rule, as in the US, where there will tend to be
two major parties. In polities using electoral systems based on proportional represen-
tation (PR) there appears to be no rationale forcing activist groups to coalesce. In the
following discussion of legislative politics we shall use estimates of party positions,
and examine the nature of the core, or heart, under the assumption that the party posi-
tions are chosen to maximise vote share, as in the above example from Turkey. If the
reasoning presented in the previous section is valid, then we should expect minority
governments in situations where there is a core party.
3.1 Left unipolar systems — Denmark, Sweden and Norway
The empirical analysis of Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990) suggests that the frequent mi-
nority governments in the period 1945–1987 in Denmark, Sweden and Norway were
based on core parties on the left of the policy space.
Denmark. The political system has a high degree of fragmentation (the effective num-
ber8 increased from about 3.8 in the late 1940s to 7.0 in 1970). The largest party is
the Social Democrat Party (SD) with 30–40 percent of the seats, and the Liberals (or
Venstre, V) with 20 to 30 percent. The SD is the only dominant party. The SD was
7 Twenty-four of these “independents” were in fact members of the DTP — the Kurdish Freedom and
Solidarity Party.
8 The effective number is the inverse of the Herﬁndahl measure of concentration. This measure is obtained
by summing the squares of the seat proportions.
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in 13 out of 21 governments in the period 1945–1987, while Venstre was a member of
the remaining governments.
Governments without a clear majority are typical in Denmark, though tacit support
is often provided by small parties. The pattern that emerges is one of SD minority
governments with support of the radical liberals (RV), Socialist People’s Party (SF) or
Communist Party (DKP) alternating with governments consisting of the Venstre and
the Conservative People’s Party (KF).
For example, Table 4 gives the election results for 1957 and 1964. Because the
parties on the right controlled more than a majority of the seats in 1957, we can infer
that the core is empty. In 1964, the right coalition gained only 84 seats, and the core
SD formed a minority government.





Socialist People’s Party SF 10
Social Democrats SD 70 76
Radical Venstre RV 14 10
Venstre or Liberals V 45 38
Conservative Party KF 30 36




1957 to 1960: {SD, RV, RF}
1960 to 1964: {SD, RV}
1964 to 1968: SD minority
Note however that the Danish system became more fragmented, so that the possi-
bility of a core declined. Figure 6 gives the estimates of positions in 2001, including
those of new parties: the Center Democrats (CD), located very close to the SD position,
but not marked, the Christian Peoples Party (KrF), Danish People’s Party (DF) and the
Red-Greens or Enhedslisten (Enh). The ﬁgure shows the median lines. The heart is the
star shaped set given in the ﬁgure, generated by the SD, DF, KF and V positions.
In the election 2001, the effective number was over 6.5, and a coalition of {V, KF}
formed, controlling 72 seats, out of 179. This coalition gained 70 seats in 2005, and
stayed in power. It would seem that the major party positions may have changed very
little over time, but there is a clear indication of an increase in fragmentation.
Sweden. The dominance of the Social Democratic Party (SAP) in Sweden was quite
pronounced, since it typically obtained just less than 50 percent of the vote, until 1970.
This implied that the only coalition excluding the SAP was a counter coalition of four
other parties on the right, making the SAP a natural core party.
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Figure 6. The heart in Denmark in 2001
























Figure 7. The heart in Sweden in 2002
In contrast, Figure 7 shows the political conﬁguration in 2002. The heart is a
triangle bounded by the positions of the Christian Democrats (KD, with 33 seats, out of
349), the SAP (with 144) and the Green Party (MP, with 17 seats). The parties outside
the heart are the Center Party (C, with 22 seats), the Moderate Party (M, with 55 seats),
the Liberal People’s Party (FP, with 48 seats) and the Left Party (V for Vansterpartiet,
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with 30 seats). Thus, in 2002, the SAP, the Left Party and the Greens together took
53% of the vote and 191 seats out of 349. In the 2006 election, the four parties of the
right (KD, M, FP and C) formed a pre-election coalition, gained 48% of the vote and
178 seats, and were able to form the government.
Norway. The Labor Party (Det Norske Arbeiderpartie or DNA) occupies a position
similar to that of the SAP in Sweden. Indeed the DNA has often been the strongly
dominant party. Until 1961 it controlled a majority of the seats. The Socialist Left
Party (SV) took only 2 seats (out of 155) in 1977 but jumped to 17 seats in 1989,
and in the recent election in September 2005 took 15 out of 169. After the election
of 1981, the three parties on the right (Center Party, Sp; Christian People’s Party, KrP;
and Conservatives, H) controlled a majority. From 1989, the radical right wing populist
Progress Party (FrP), founded by Anders Lange, grew rapidly, gaining 38 seats in 2005.
After the 1989 and 1993 elections the DNA was essentially at the core position with a
plurality of the vote and was able to form a minority government.
In 1997 however, the DNA lost a couple of seats, and the DNA leader, Jagland,
stepped down, leading to the formation of a minority right wing coalition, led by Bon-
devik of the KrP, together with the Center Party. The unwillingness of the three right
wing parties to form a coalition with the FrP led to the minority right wing coalition
from 1997 to 2005. In the 2005 election, the Center Party switched, forming a Red-
Green coalition with the DNA and the SV. This alliance took 87 seats out of 169, and
was able to form the ﬁrst majority coalition in Norway since 1985. (See Strom 1991
for an earlier discussion of minority coalitions in Norway.) Note however, that if the
parties on the right could agree to form a coalition with the Progress Party, then the
heart is the set bounded by the positions of the DNA, the Sp and the Liberals (V),
making the Sp a pivot party between coalitions of the left and right. See Figure 8.

























Figure 8. The heart in Norway in 2001
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3.2 Center unipolar systems — Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland
Belgium. Belgium is an interesting example with respect to the theoretical prediction
about the core. In the period up to the late 1960s, the political conﬁguration based on
three parties meant that the core was empty and minimal winning coalition govern-
ments the rule. However after 1970, increasing political fragmentation resulting from
conﬂicts over language and regional autonomy led to the replacement of the three party
system with a multiparty system generated by the federalist-unitary dimension. The
entrance of new parties, including the nationalist Voksunie (VU) in 1954, the Rassem-
blement Wallon (RW) and the Francophone Democratic Front (FDF), increased the
effective seat number (to 6.0 by 1971). The centrist Christelijke Volspartij (CV) was
almost continually in power until the election of 1999, when it lost its plurality status,
gaining only 22 seats out of 150, in comparison to the 23 seats of the Flemish Liberal
and Democrat Party (VLD). In 1999, a coalition of six parties with 94 seats formed the
government: VLD, the two wings of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, or PS and the
Socialistische Partij, SP, with 33 seats between them), the Free Democrat Party (FDF)
with 18 seats, and 20 seats from two other small, green parties (Ecolo,EC, and Agalev,
AG). Figure 9 shows the party positions, on the assumption that the two socialist par-
ties (PS and SP) were at the same position. The heart illustrates the various coalition
possibilities. The Volksunie had split into a nationalist wing (VU&ID) and a more fed-
eralist component, the Flemish Block (VB). These parties, together with the National
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Figure 9. The heart in Belgium in 1999
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3 223N. Schoﬁeld, U. Ozdemir
In2003, theCVrenameditselftheChristianDemocraticandFlemishParty(CD&V)
and won 21 seats while the FDF was renamed the Reformist Movement (MR) and won
24 seats. The green parties only won four seats. The other small parties were the New
Flemish Alliance (N-VA) with 1 seat and the Humanistic Democratic Center (CDH)
with 8. The Francophone Socialist Party (PS) won 25 seats while the Flemish Socialist
Party (SP) formed an aliance with Spirit (Sp), a small offshoot of the VU, and this
cartel won 23 seats. Assuming that the two parties, PS and SPSp, were at distinct posi-
tions gives the heart as shown in Figure 10. This illustrates the more complex coalition
possibilities as a result of the increasing fragmentation that occurred between 1999 and
2003. The effective number increased from 7.0 to 8.0 between these elections. Guy
Verhofstadt of the VLD became prime minister in 2003.




























Figure 10. The heart in Belgium in 2003
In the election of 10 June 2007, the CD&V went from 21 seats to 30 (out of 150),
becoming the largest party in the Chamber of Representatives. After a month of nego-
tiation, King Albert II asked the leader of the CD&V, Yves Leterme, to be formateur
of a coalition government. Leterme found this impossible, and resigned from the task
on 23 August. Belgium was without an effective government for a record six months.
On December 23, 2007, the VLD under Guy Verhofstadt formed an “interim govern-
ment” and won a vote of conﬁdence in parliament, with 97 votes in favor, 46 opposed,
and one abstention, thus assuring it legitimacy for three months. Finally, on March 20,
2008, Yves Leterme was sworn in as prime minister, backed by a ﬁve party coalition.
Luxembourg. The largest party is the Christian Social Party (CSV) with about one
third of the seats, followed by the Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP) with
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between one quarter and one third of the seats. The smaller Democratic Party (DP)
generally gains just less than one ﬁfth of the seats. The heart is clearly based on
the triad of the positions {LSAP, CVP, DP}, and governments tend to be associated
with pairwise minimal winning coalitions: {LSAP, DP} in 1974–1979, {CVP, DP} in
1979–1984 and 1999–2004, and {LSAP,CVP} after the election of 2004.
Ireland. Ireland is especially interesting because it has a dominant center party (Fianna
Fail) and unlike Belgium or Luxembourg, there have been a number of minority (Fi-
anna Fail) governments. To see the complexity of the bargaining possibilities, consider
Table 5 which lists the seat strengths after February 1987 in the Dail Eireann.
Table 5. Party and faction strengths in the D´ ail Eireann, 1987
Left
Workers’ Party (WP) 4
Democratic Socialist Party 1
Labor (LB) 12
Tony Gregory (Left wing Independent) 1
Sean Treacy (Ex-Labor Independent) 1
Ceann Comhairle: Neil Blaney (Independent, NB) 1
Center
Fine Gael (FG) 51
Fianna F´ ail (FF) 81
Progressive Democrats (PD) 14
Total 166
A coalition of Fine Gael and Labor had collapsed in January 1987, and Garret
Fitzgerald remained Toaiseach, leading a caretaker minority Fine Gael government.
Clearly the natural minimal winning coalitions were {Fianna F´ ail, Progressive Demo-
crats} with 94 seats, {Fianna F´ ail, Fine Gael}, {Fianna F´ ail, Labor} with 93, and an
unlikelycoalitionofFianna F´ ailwiththefarleftparties. Figure11indicatesthemedian
lines based on estimates of the party positions and that of the independent, Neil Blaney
at NB. We may infer that Fianna F´ ail was indeed a core party, suggesting a minority
government. This is precisely what occurred. Sean Treacy became Ceann Comhairle
(Chairman) of the Dail. Tony Gregory abstained and Haughey (with Neil Blaney) had
82 votes out of 164, with Treacy casting the deciding vote for the government.
After the 2002 election, Fianna F´ ail obtained 80 seats, out of 166, while the other
party strengths were: Fine Gael (FG,31), Labor (LB, 21), Progressive Democrats (PD,
8), Greens (GR, 6), Sinn F´ ein (SF, 5), with 15 seats belonging to other independents
and factions. Bertie Ahern, leader of Fianna F´ ail formed a coalition with the Progres-
sive Democrats, controlling 88 seats, sufﬁcient for a majority. In the May 24, 2007,
election, Fianna F´ ail won 78 seats, while the Progressive Democrats only won 2 seats,
not enough to form a majority coalition. Fine Gael increased its strength to 51, while
Labor dropped to 20. Only 5 seats went to independents, while the Greens won 6 seats
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Figure 11. The heart in Ireland in 1987

























Figure 12. The heart in Ireland in 2007
and Sinn F´ ein won 4. Figure 12 suggests the nature of the heart. The medians through
the FG position are based on the assumption that 1 seat will be taken by the Ceann
Comhairle and the independents’ positions are between FG and LB. Enda Kenny, the
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leader of Fine Gael, initially refused to concede defeat, as it was theoretically possible
for him to put together a majority anti-Fianna F´ ail coalition, but this would require the
support of either Sinn F´ ein or all four independents. Kenny’s ambition was squashed
by the formation of a coalition government on June 14, led by Ahern, involving Fianna
F´ ail, the Greens and the Progressive Democrats, controlling 86 seats. The Greens bar-
gained for speciﬁc policy objectives and cabinet positions. The coalition, together with
four of the independents, elected John O Donoghue as Ceann Comhairle by 90 to 75.
A corruption scandal forced Ahern to announce his resignation as from May 6.
3.3 A right unipolar system
Iceland. To some extent Iceland is a mirror image of the three Scandinavian politi-
cal systems. In the 2003 election, the largest party was the right-wing Independence
Party (IP) which took 22 seats out of 63. At the center are two parties: the Progres-
sive Party (PP) with 12 seats in 2003 and a small Liberal Party (F) with 4 seats. On
the left was the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) with 20 seats, and the Left-Green
Movement (G) with 4. The heart is given by the triad of positions {SDA, PP, IP} indi-
cating the likelihood of minimal winning coalitions. David Oddsson, the leader of IP,
had served as Prime Minister from 1991 to 1995, in alliance with SDA, and then from
1995 to 2004 in alliance with the PP. Oddsson was succeeded in September 2004 by
Halldor Asgrimsson of the PP. A coalition government of the IP, under Geir Haarde,
with the PP formed in June 2006. In the election of May 13, 2007, the Independence





















Figure 13. The heart in Iceland in 2003
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Party picked up two additional seats for a total of 24, while the Progressive Party went
from 12 seats to 8, leading to an IP-SDA coalition government under Haarde. This
collapsed dramatically on January 26, 2009, as a result of the ﬁnancial collapse threat-
ening the country. Johanna Sigurdardottir became prime minister, leading a caretaker
coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Left-Green Movement for the
three months until the new election on April 25, 2009. At that election, the SDA won
20 seats to 14 for the Left-Greens, while the IP was reduced to 16 seats, consolidat-
ing Sigurdardottir’s position as prime minister, and her call for Iceland to enter the
European Union.
Figure 13 gives an estimate of the heart in 2003. The increase in the size of the
Left-Greens created a new median line between SDA and G, so the heart in 2009 is the
triangle [SDA, G, IP].
3.4 Triadic systems
Austria. In Austria the large parties are the Social Democrat Party (SPO) and People’s
Party (OVP). Until 1959 the Communists (KPO) had roughly four seats, while the
Freedom Party (FPO, but called the League of Independents before 1956), generally
won between six and eleven seats up until 1979. The OVP won majorities in 1945
(with 85 seats) and in 1966 (with 84 seats). The SPO, under Bruno Kreisky, gained
majorities in the elections of 1971, 1975 and 1975, and between 1983 to 1986 formed a
coalition with the FPO. From 1986 until 1999 the grand SPO-OVP coalition governed.
From 1995 to 1999, partly under the leadership of J¨ org Haider, the FPO increased in






















Figure 14. The heart in Austria in 2006
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with 52 seats out of 183). Surprisingly, the FPO gained a slightly larger proportion of
the vote than the OVP. Various controversies over the FPO leadership lead to a new
election in 2002. Haider had resigned the leadership of the FPO in 2000, and, in the
2002 election, the FPO strength fell to 18 seats, while the OVP jumped to 79 seats.
For the ﬁrst time since 1966, the OVP gained a higher proportion of the vote than the
SPO (presumably because of the collapse of the FPO). In 2005, Haider formed a new
party, the “Alliance for the future of Austria”, BZO), which only gained 7 seats in the
2006 election. The OVP, with 66 seats, then formed a coalition with the FPO (with
its 21 seats), against the SPO, with its 68 seats and the Greens (Gru) with its 21 seats.
Figure 14 shows the heart for the election of 2006. Assuming that the BZO is located
at the FPO position, the heart is based on the triad SPO/Gru, OVP, FPO}.
In the election of September 2008, the far-right parties gained substantially, pre-
sumably because of anti-immigration sentiments. The Freedom Party, led by Heinz-
Christian Strache, won 18 percent of the vote, a gain of 7 percentage points over 2006,
while the BZO, still led by J¨ org Haider, got 11 percent, nearly tripling its result of
2006.
Germany. Figure 15 shows the heart for the election of 2002 in Germany, where the
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) gained 248 seats, the Social Democrat Party (SPD)
gained 251 seats, and the Free Democrat Party (FDP) gained 47 seats. The Greens
(GRU) with 55 seats formed a minimal winning coalition with the SPD until the
September 2005 election. As the ﬁgure indicates, the {SPD, GRU} median line is
one of the boundaries of the heart, and so this coalition is a natural one to form. After
the September 2005 election, however, the Greens gained 51 seats against 61 for the





















Figure 15. The heart in Germany in 2002
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FDP and 54 for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Since the CDU only gained
225 seats in contrast to 222 for the SPD there was an impasse. The coalition {PDS,
GRU, SPD} is now possible, causing a contraction of the heart. Eventually Merkel,
of the CDU, became Chancellor, leading the grand CDU/CSU-SPD coalition. In the
election of 27 September, 2009, the CDU/CSU won 239 seats in all, and their new
coalition allies, the FDP, won 93, giving a majority of 332 out of 622. The SPD fell to
146 seats, with the Left winning 76, and the Greens with 68.
3.5 A collapsed core
Italy. Italy needs a category of its own, as it was originally a center unipolar system,
where the dominant party, the Christian Democrat Party (DC) was in a uniquely pow-
erful position until the 1994 election. The DC went from 206 seats (out of 630) in
1992 to 33 in 1994. Until 1987 the DC controlled about 40 percent of the seats, with
the Communist Party (PCI) and Socialists (PSI) controlling less than 30 percent each.
The smaller parties include the Social Democrats (PSDI), Republicans (PRI), Liberals
(PLI), Monarchists (PDIUM), and Neofascists (MSI). Aside from the ﬁrst two govern-
ments in 1946 and 1947, the Communists never belonged to a coalition government.
The DC was strongly dominant, and the only party able to position itself at a struc-
turally stable core in a two-dimensional policy space, as indicated in Figure 16 (based















































Figure 16. The core in Italy in 1987
The persistence of the Pentapartito coalition (1979–1989) comprising a coalition
of DC, PSI, PRI, PLI and the PSDI is further evidence that the core was non-empty.
To control the distribution of government perquisites, the DC maintained a grand,
anti-PCI coalition. Schoﬁeld (1993) suggested that corruption associated with these
perquisites eventually led to an anti-DC coalition based on new parties such as the
Northern League and the Greens. Mershon (2002), Giannetti and Sened (2004) and
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Schoﬁeld and Sened (2006) discuss the dramatic changes in Italian politics that oc-
curred in the period 1992–1996. Figure 17 indicates the quite new Italian conﬁguration
based on the positions of the parties in 2001: the Alleanza Nazionale (AN, 24 seats),
Democratici di Sinistra (DS, 31 seats), Forza Italia (FI, 62 seats), La Margherita (Marg,
27 seats), and Rifondazione Comunista (RC, 11 seats).























Figure 17. The heart in Italy in 2001
Since then there have been oscillations between leftand right, the mostrecent being
Berlusconi’s election success on April 14, 2008.
4. A spatial model of elections
The model of coalition bargaining, discussed in the previous sections, suggest that
even when there is no majority party then a large, centrally located party, at a “core”
position in the policy space, willbe dominant. Such a core party can, ifit chooses, form
a minority government by itself and control policy outcomes (see Schoﬁeld, Grofman
and Feld 1989; Laver and Schoﬁeld 1990, 1998; Banks and Duggan 2000; Schoﬁeld
and Sened 2006). If party leaders are aware of the fact that they can control policy from
the core, then this centripetal tendency should lead parties to position themselves at the
center. Moreover, the “mean voter theorem,” based on a stochastic model of election
and on vote maximization, suggests that the electoral origin will be a Nash equilibrium
(Adams 1999a,b, 2001; Adams and Merrill 1999; Lin, Enelow and Dorussen 1999;
Banks and Duggan 2005; McKelvey and Patty 2006). These two very different models
of political strategy suggest that parties will tend to locate themselves at the electoral
center.
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Yet, contrary to this intuition, there is ample empirical evidence that party leaders
do not necessarily adopt centrist positions. The previous sections present evidence to
this effect.
Section 2 of this paper brieﬂy considered a formal stochastic model developed in
Schoﬁeld (2007) that is based on the valence of the party. Valences are party biases,
derived from voters’ judgements about characteristics of the candidates, or party lead-
ers, which cannot be ascribed to the policy choice of the party. One may conceive of
the valence that a voter ascribes to a party leader as a judgement of the leader’s quality
or competence.
This section considers a more general valence model (Schoﬁeld 2006a) based on
activist support for the parties (Aldrich 1983a,b; Aldrich and McGinnis 1989; Aldrich
1995; Stokes 1992). This activist valence model presupposes that party activists do-
nate time and other resources to their party. Such resources allow a party to present
itself more effectively to the electorate, thus increasing its valence. Since activists tend
to be more radical than the average voter, parties are faced with a dilemma. By ac-
commodating the political demands of activists, a party gains resources that it can use
to enhance its valence, but by adopting the radical policies demanded by activists, the
party may appear too extreme and lose electoral support. The party must therefore
balance the electoral effect against the activist valence effect. The result gives this a a
ﬁrst order balance condition between electoral and activist support. Since valence in
this model is affected by activist support, it may exhibit “decreasing returns to scale”
and this may induce concavity in the vote share functions of the parties. Consequently,
when the concavity of activists’ valence is sufﬁciently pronounced then a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the vote maximizing game will exist. The result indicates
that there is no reason for this equilibrium to be one where all parties adopt centrist
positions.
Throughout it is assumed that the stochastic errors have the Type I extreme value
(or Gumbel) distribution, Y. The formal model based on Y parallels the empirical
models based on multinomial logit (MNL) estimation (Dow and Endersby 2004).
The key idea underlying the formal model is that party leaders attempt to estimate
the electoral effects of party declarations, or manifestos, and choose their own posi-
tions as best responses to other party declarations, in order to maximize their own vote
share. The stochastic model essentially assumes that party leaders cannot predict vote
response precisely, but can estimate an expected vote share.
Deﬁnition 1. The Stochastic Vote Model E(l,m,b;Y) with Activist Valence:
The data of the spatial model is a distribution, {xi ∈ X : i ∈ N}, of voter ideal points for
the members of the electorate, N, of size n. We assume that X is a open, convex subset
ofEuclidean space, Rw, withwﬁnite. EachofthepartiesinthesetP={1,..., j,...,p}
chooses a policy, zj ∈ X, to declare. Let z = (z1,...,zp) ∈ X p be a typical vector of
party policy positions.
Given z, each voter, i, is described by a vector
ui(xi,z) = (ui1(xi,z1),...,uip(xi,zp)),
where uij(xi,zj) = lj +mj(zj)−b||xi−zj||2+ej = u∗
ij(xi,zj)+ej.
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Here u∗
ij(xi,zj) is the observable component of utility. The term, lj, is the ﬁxed or
intrinsic valence of agent j, while the function mj(zj) is the component of valence
generated by activist contributions to agent j. The term b is a positive constant, called
thespatialparameter, givingtheimportanceofpolicydifferencedeﬁnedintermsofthe
Euclidean norm, ||·||, on X. The vector e = (e1,...,ej,...,ep) is the stochastic error,
whose multivariate cumulative distribution,Y, is the Type I extreme value distribution
with the closed form
Y(x) = exp[−exp[−x]].
Voter behavior is modeled by a probability vector. The probability that a voter i
chooses party j at the vector z is
rij(z) = Pr[uij(xi,zj) > uil(xi,zl), for all l 6= j]
= Pr[el −ej < u∗
ij(xi,zj)−u∗
il(xi,zj), for all l 6= j].
HerePrstandsfortheprobabilityoperatorgeneratedbythedistributionassumptionone.


















is locally maximized at z∗
j.
Schoﬁeld (2006a) shows that the ﬁrst order condition for z∗ to be a LNE is that it
be a balance solution.
Deﬁnition 2. The balance solution for the model E(l,m,b;Y):







be the p by n matrix of coefﬁcients. The balance equation for z∗


























AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3 233N. Schoﬁeld, U. Ozdemir
is called the marginal electoral pull of party j at zj and is a gradient vector pointing
towards the weighted electoral mean. This weighted electoral mean is that point where
the electoral pull is zero. Then z∗



















p) has the property that each z∗
j satisﬁes the bal-
ance equation then call z∗ the balance solution.
Theorem 1. (Schoﬁeld 2006a) Consider the electoral model E(l,m,b;Y) based on
theTypeIextremevaluedistribution, andincludingbothintrinsicandactivistvalences.
The ﬁrst order condition for z∗ to be an LNE is that it is a balance solution. If all ac-
tivist valence functions are highly concave, in the sense of having negative eigenvalues
of sufﬁciently great magnitude, then the balance solution will be a PNE.
Themarginalelectoralpullofparty j isagradientvectorpointingtowardstheweighted
electoral mean of the party. This weighted electoral mean is that point where the elec-
toral pull is zero. This gradient points toward the electoral center and represents the
centripetal pull to the center The marginal activist pull for party j represents the cen-
trifugal force generated by the resources made available by activists.
In principle, this model can be used to examine positions of parties as they respond
to activist demands in order to gain resources that can be used to contest elections.
This model has been used to consider electoral competition when there are only two
dimensions of policy, and a small number of parties competing under plurality rule.
Figure 18 gives an illustration taken from Schoﬁeld (2005) based on an empir-
ical model for Britain for recent elections. In the ﬁgure there are two dimensions,
one labelled the economic left/right and one labelled Pro-Britain/Pro-Europe. The La-
bor Party (using the U.S. spelling) beneﬁts from resources from two potential activist
groups, with preferred policy positions at L and E. The contract curve is the curve con-
necting these preferred positions of an activist group (L) on the economic left and an
activist group (E), supporting membership of a strong European Union. This model,
applied to British elections for 1992–2002, did appear to give some insight into the
position of the Labor Party under Blair, near to the electoral center, in contrast to the
Conservative Party, whose political leaders were estimated to have relatively low va-
lence.
Miller and Schoﬁeld (2003, 2008) and Schoﬁeld and Miller (2007) have used this
model (based on an economic axis and a social axis) to account for conﬂicts between
economic and social conservatives, positioned at E and C respectively in Figure 19,
over support for Republican Party candidates. As the ﬁgure also indicates, there are
potential conﬂicts between pro-labor activists at L, and social activists at S.
As suggested by the notion of a balance locus, candidates for ofﬁce in a two party
system must balance the centripetal electoral gradient against a centrifugal activist gra-
dient.
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Figure 18. The electoral and activist pulls for the Labor Party in Britain
Figure 19 illustrates these formal results, by showing the contract curves between
E and C. The equilibrium position for a Republican candidate will depend on the Re-
publican intrinsic valence and the position adopted by the opposition candidate. When
there is a single economic dimension, then the valence difference between the con-
tenders will separate them on left and right. Potential activist concerns can then bring
the second, social dimension into existence. Optimal, or vote maximizing, candidate
positions will lie on the two balance loci. In general the optimal position for a low
valence candidate like Goldwater will lie on a balance locus farther from the electoral
center than that of a candidate like Bush whose valence is relatively higher. Figure 20
illustrates the voter distribution and candidate positions in the 2000 election in the
United States obtained by Schoﬁeld, Claasen, Ozdemir and Zakharov (2009).
As these ﬁgures suggest, the changing conﬁguration of centripetal and centrifugal
forces appears to lead to a slow rotation in the conﬁguration of the parties. Schoﬁeld,
Miller and Martin (2003) and Schoﬁeld (2006b) suggest that a political realignment
(Sundquist 1973) occurs when the two party conﬁguration is changed suddenly (as the
result of a constitutional quandary). Indeed, the recent election of Barack Obama may
be seen as marking the resolution of such a political and economic quandary. The
historical analysis offered by Schoﬁeld (2006b) suggests that this process of realign-
ing transformation has tended to occur in a“clockwise” direction since the election of
Lincoln in 1860.






























Figure 19. The Balance Loci in the US

























Figure 20. The electoral distribution and candidate positions in the 2000 election in the US
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5. Concluding remarks
This paper has discussed a number of European multiparty polities with electoral sys-
tems based on proportional representation, as well as Turkey, the United States and
Britain. It is evident that they all display complex and distinct characteristic features.
Although this paper has suggested a typology of the multiparty polities based on
the qualitative features of the core and the heart, it is evident that the suggested typo-
logy does not give a full account of the complexities of coalitional bargaining. The key
features of this typology is the degree of fragmentation, and the extent of centrality (i.e.
whether a dominant party occupies the core position). What is remarkable, however, is
the degree to which each country exhibits a pattern of coalition government that is con-
sistent, in some sense, over time. It is hardly surprising that comparative scholars have
found these patterns to be of such great theoretical interest. Estimating party positions,
and attempting to model coalition bargaining between the parties is a major challenge
for comparative research. Recent work by Benoit and Laver (2006) on estimating party
position for a large number of political conﬁgurations is a signiﬁcant advance, and their
estimates have proved invaluable as a means to estimate the legislative heart in these
polities.
The purpose of the spatial analysis presented here is to give some insight into the
complexities of multi-party bargaining. The typology presented here has used the the-
ory based on the existence of core parties and on the heart as an indication of the
bargaining domain when the core is empty. Some countries are characterized by the
existence of a dominant party, able to attain enough seats to be strongly dominant and
command the core position. In the bipolar polities there are two potentially dominant
parties, each one of which may be able to gain enough seats on occasion to control the
core. Increasing fragmentation may make it less likely that a core party can exist. As
the conﬁguration of the heart becomes more complex, then bargaining over govern-
ment will also become more complex. It is hardly surprising that fragmentation will
be associated with less durable government (see King et al. 1990).
The main theoretical point that emerges is that the conﬁguration of the heart in
these polities suggests that there is hardly any centripetal tendency towards an electoral
center (as suggested by the “mean voter therem” of Lin et al. 1999). It is consistent
with this analysis presented hare that activist groups will tend to pull the parties away
from the center. Indeed, we can follow Duverger (1954) and Riker (1953) and note that
under proportional electoral methods, there is very little motivation for interest groups
to coalesce. Consequently, the fragmentation of interest groups will lead to a degree of
fragmentation in the polity. Fragmentation may be mitigated by the electoral system
(especially if there is a relatively high electoral requirement which determines whether
a party will obtain some legislative representation). However, even when there is a
degree of majoritarianism in the electoral system (as in Italy in recent years) this may
have little effect on reducing fragmentation. Clearly if one party dominates coalition
policy for a long period of time then there will be a much higher degree of stability than
indicated purely by government duration. However, as the situation in Italy circa 1994
suggests, if there is a core party facing little in terms of real political opposition, then
corruption may become persistent. For democratic polities, there may be an element
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of a quandary associated with the choice of an electoral system. If it is based on pro-
portional representation then there may be the possibility of dominance by a centrally
located party. Alternatively, there may be coalitional instability resulting from a frag-
mented polity and a complex conﬁguration of parties. Another way of expressing, in
simpliﬁed form, the difference between proportional representation and plurality rule
is this: under proportional electoral methods, bargaining to create winning coalitions
occurs after the election. Under plurality rule, if interest groups do not form a coalition
before the election, then they can be obliterated, creating a pressure to coalesce.
The spatial maps together with the formal results based on the spatial model of
elections suggest the following set of conclusions:
(i) The pure spatial model of direct democracy indicates that the occurence of a
core, or unbeaten alternative, is very unlikely in a direct democracy using ma-
jority rule, when the dimension of the policy is at least two (McKelvey and
Schoﬁeld 1987; Saari 1997). However, a social choice concept known as the
heart, a generalization of the core, will exist, and converges to the core when the
core is non-empty (Schoﬁeld 1999).
(ii) A legislative body, made up of democratically elected representatives, can be
modeled in social choice terms. Because party strengths will be disparate, a
large, centrally located party may be located at a core position. Such a party, in
a situation with no majority party, may be able to form a minority government.
Instances from Scandinavia, Italy, and possibly Ireland are discussed here.
(iii) A more typical situation is one with no core party. In such a case, the legislative
heart can give an indication of the nature of bargaining between parties as they
attempt to form a winning coalition government.
(iv) This theory of legislative behavior takes as given the position and strengths of the
parties. Because a centrally located party may dominate coalitional bargaining,
and because such a party should be able to garner a large share of the vote, there
would appear to be a strong centripetal tendency in all electoral systems.
(v) However, estimates of party positions suggest that parties adopt quite heteroge-
nous positions (see Benoit and Laver 2006). This suggests that there is a coun-
tervailing or centrifugal force that affects all parties.
(vi) While core parties can be observed in a number of polities with electoral sys-
tems based on proportional rule, the dominance of such central parties can be
destroyed, particularly if there is a tendency to political fragmentation and social
conﬂict.
(vii) It is very unlikely that the heterogenous positions of the parties can be accounted
for in terms of a stochastic model of elections based on intrinsic valence alone.
EmpiricalworkonItaly, Netherlands BritainandtheUnitedStates canbeusedto
substantiate this inference (Giannetti and Sened 2004; Schoﬁeld 2005; Schoﬁeld
and Sened 2006; Schoﬁeld, Claasen, Ozdemir and Zakharov 2009).
238 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining
(viii) This suggests that party location can be better modeled as a balancing act be-
tween the centripetal electoral pull and the activist centrifugal pull.
(ix) Under proportional electoral methods, there need be no strong tendency forcing
activist groups to coalesce, in order to concentrate their inﬂuence. If activist
groups respond to this impulse, then activist fragmentation will result in party
fragmentation. As the ﬁgures in Section 3 of this paper illustrate, parties tend
to be scattered throughout the policy space. Activist groups, linked to small
parties, may aspire to political ofﬁce. This is indicated by the observation that
the bargaining domain in the legislature (the heart) often includes small parties.
(x) In some counties (such as Italy), a centrist core party can dominate the political
landscape. To maintain dominance, such a party requires a high valence leader
who can also maintain a ﬂow of resources from a centrist activist group. By
deﬁnition however, an activist group will tend to be located at a policy extreme.
Thus a core party may need the support of an activist group that is not concerned
about policy per se, but about monetary rewards. Thus there may be a link
between core dominance and corruption. A development of this notion could
give the underlying reason for the collapse of core dominance in Italy.
(xi) Under plurality rule, small parties face the possibility of extinction. Unlike the
situation in a a polity based on proportional rule, an activist group linked to a
small party in a plurality polity has little expectation of inﬂuencing government
policy. Thus activist groups face increasing returns to size. The activist model of
elections presented in Section 4 suggests that when there are two dimensions of
policy, then there will tend to be at most four principal activist groups. The na-
ture of the electoral contest generally forces these four principal activist groups
to coalesce into at most two, as in the United States and the United Kingdom.
(xii) In the United States, plurality rule induces the two party system, through this
effect on activist groups. Although the two party conﬁguration may be in equi-
librium at any time, the tension within the activist coalitions induces a slow ro-
tation, and thus political realignment. Presidential candidates must balance the
centripetal electoral effect against the centrifugal valence effect. It is plausible
that, in general, the relative electoral effect is stronger under plurality than under
proportional rule. Of course, this depends on the intensity of the policy conﬂict
between activist groups.
(xiii) The well known relationship between proportional representation and a degree
of political fragmentation (as measured by effective number) may be accounted
for indirectly as a consequence of the logic forced on activist groups rather than
parties themselves.
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